THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE IN WEST PAPUA

Papers for the Conference on 'Crimes of State in West Papua: Kidnapping and Murder of Theys Hiyo Eluay, Face the State Violence in Papua (West), organized by ELS-HAM Papua, West Papua and CONTRAST Legal Aid of West Papua in Jakarta, March 21 to 22 2002.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE IN WEST PAPUA:

George Junus Aditjondro

(Lecturer Course Independence Movements Post-colonial,

University of Newcastle, NSW, Australia)

INTRODUCTION

WHY Theys Hiyo Eluay was killed on Saturday evening, November 10 last year? Before answering that question, perhaps we also need to ask ourselves, why the launch and discussion of the results of an independent investigation of the death of the leader of the Papua Presidium Council, we should do in Jakarta, not in the Land of Papua, for example in Sentani, or at Port Numbay.

The answer may be because the organizers of this conference was, Tanah Papua is now less and less safe for this kind of critical activity. Or maybe there is a presumption, that they are at the last agency responsible for the deaths of large ondofolo this Sentani tribe, located in Jakarta. Hence, this conference as well as a demand to hand the ruling, so that legal action be taken against the killers paitua this Eluay, not just against the subordinates who only aim at carrying out orders, but also to giving orders.

Let us now return to the question opening this note: why Theys was murdered? After reviewing the entire development of West Papuan independence movement, especially during the last ten years, I came to the conclusion that the killing of Papuan Presidium Council was to deflate wing of the independence movement in the city, on campus, at church and in the government bureaucracy, who fight for their goals through peaceful means, and thus armed guerrilla struggle back into the main strategy for the West Papuan nationalists.

Why struggle for independence in West Papua should be returned to the armed guerrilla rail? The answer is simple: as such, West Papua can be maintained in a de facto as vulnerable areas, or in the 'language Aceh' her,' Military Operations Area ', and thus, the official armed forces were able to maintain their hegemony over the region , although the de jure, the central government has delegated the authority - including authority to levy a fairly high pick from the processing of natural resources here - to local governments, in particular, the second level of local government.

In other words, what has been granted by Jakarta to the people of Papua with his right hand, want to be taken back with his left hand. And what other measures could encourage young nationalists in Papua to strengthen the back row of OPM guerrillas with Tepenal and Papenalnya, if they come to the conclusion that the struggle for peace there will be no result, rather than kill the symbol of peaceful struggle, Theys Hiyo Eluay?

Indeed, we hear every time Jakarta decided to send troops into troubled areas to escape the clutches of the central government, is that their job is to maintain the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) at all costs. That's the official rhetoric we always hear. But beneath the rhetoric it is the military's business interests and the police, who have breed with fertile in Indonesia, since pioneered by former president Soeharto in the area that is now a Territory IV Diponegoro military command.

The approach I use in this paper based on the view that behind each set of violence is always tucked economic interests. That approach has been developed by the German anthropologist, Georg Etwert from the University of Berlin, who developed the concept of "markets of violence", which perhaps can be translated into "market abuse". As word Elwert (1999: 41):

"By markets of violence I mean conflicts categorised as civil wars, Warlord-dominated systems or Banditry, Nowhere, Beneath a superficial gloss of Philosophical or power-political objectives or obligations to fight, ostensibly based on tradition, the economic motive of material profit dominates . Markets based on violence cans come into being in the which areas are open to violence - especially in the absence of a monopoly of violence. "

THREE FEET IN INDONESIAN MILITARY BUSINESS

Inspired by the theory of 'markets of violence' is, let's surgical business in the Indonesian military. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term "military business" only, but it is already implicit in the concept of business as well the police and various paramilitary groups who took part supported by the state apparatus. This military business, not only in the form of companies under the umbrella, or contain stocks foundations and cooperatives owned by the military and police. A more complete description of this military business has at least three feet. The first leg is what is called by Indria Samego et al from LIPI as "Armed Forces of institutional business." The second leg is what they call a "non-institutional business armed forces", ie businesses owned by retired military and their families, who have developed into powerful conglomerates.

While the third leg, which has not been much studied, is what could be mentioned as "gray businesses" military and police, which is quite wide-ranging, from the collection (more appropriately called, pemalakan) the cost of protection of giant companies who want to be protected from booty rioters armed groups and armed with sharp weapons fire, and have enough mass to intimidate, to illegal arms sales, drug trafficking, commercial sex workers (CSWs), up to trade in endangered flora and fauna.

The relationship between institutional business and non-institutional, it's pretty obvious. Suharto's relatives and cronies, has long had a 'habit' to recruit former military and police commanders in their companies, in a position as commissioner. Conversely, there is also a former military commanders and police after the body employed to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), turned out to have the business talent that is thick, so finished his tenure in the state-owned companies led (read: the diperasnya) they have enough capital and network of relationships that is wide enough, so it can begin to build their family-owned conglomerates. An example is quite popular is the late Ibnu Sutowo, who after being laid off by Suharto after a scandal Pertamina tanker worth U.S. $ 10 billion, managed to help Nugra Santana Group with her children. Or retired generals and A.R. Bustanil Arifin Ramly, after each long enough to cultivate the capital during the lead Bulog and PT Timah, can build their Group Danitama group.

The third leg, as the name suggests, the "gray business", is not yet widely highlighted, because it is not clearly recorded in trade statistics, and because some (large?) Is illegal and an abuse of public facilities. Sometimes, this gray business run by companies that are legal, that is, a legal entity, even of Limited Liability Company. For example, in my research via CD-ROM PT Inti Dataindo Swakarsa, I find that Yapto Soerjosoemarno, former head of Pemuda Pancasila which holds a law degree and had his lawyer's office itself, Yapto & Associates. On his lawyer's office address, in Jalan H. Samali No. 31, Kalibata, South Jakarta, there is a another company, PT Mahaphala Cakti, which feeds the weapons for the army and police.

But no weapon that most businesses generate a lot of money for the company. According to the results of my investigation, the supply of rations for the troops and police serving in the field, and the supply of cement for the construction of dormitories and rehabilityasi troops and police across Indonesia, hundreds of them, is a larger source of income for PT Mahaphala Cakti, rather than the sale of weapons to soldiers and police. So you can imagine, every decision of a Commander in Jakarta - TNI chief does not need to own, but enough Kostrad - to send hundreds of troops into a turbulent region, strengthen Yapto pocket.

Moreover, the government's decision to revive the military command, military command which had been closed, as Kodam Iskandar Muda in Aceh and Maluku Pattimura Regional Military Command, will be addressed by Yapto with twinkling eyes, imagine the amount of orders that will go to build and upgrade dormitory- dormitories and offices soldiers Kodim, Korem and Kodam in both directions ground water.

Simply put, the correlation between unrest and social upheaval and military business can be described as follows:

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BUSINESS

INSTITUTIONAL

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STRUCTURE RIOT /

ABRI's territorial social unrest

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BUSINESS BUSINESS

NON-INSTITUTIONAL GRAY

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From the chart above, we can see that the node connecting the three forms of military business is a territorial structure of the armed forces, because it is the basis for the territorial structure of the organization of military institutional business, which in turn is related to non-institutional business as well as their gray business. In the neighborhood of the Army, for example, each military region have Primkopadnya, every Kodam have Puskopadnya, and at the central level there is Inkopad. Some Kodam, especially in Java, has his own foundation. Similarly, Police-Police, once again, especially in Java Regional Police, where in addition to berlingkup Yayasan Brata Bhakti that nationally, there is also a 'son of the foundation', such as Yayasan Brata Bhakti Jakarta Raya. Furthermore, foundations, along with Inkopad, Inkopal, Inkopau and Inkoppol, became a shareholder of dozens of large companies. While the former commander of the 3rd generation as well as the former police chief and former police chief, are often appointed as commissioner of the various family-owned company of the capitalist bureaucrats and retired military, so there was a link between the territorial structure of non-institutional business-military.

Third leg of military business is growing back and forth, to swell and shrink, follow the dynamics of social unrest in this country. Why? Because almost every riot or social upheaval in every area in Indonesia, is considered an issue that should be 'taken care' by the army with the militaristic ways, and not by the police. Or even if here and there already taken care of by the police, especially by the military from the police, the Mobile Brigade, also remained militaristic way of handling, and not by the ways police in liberal democratic states to handle the mass upheaval, with as little as possible victims soul. This difference is of course easy to find its roots in the doctrine of dual function is now simply renamed TNI dual function. Hence, as long as Indonesia does not remove this doctrine from the political system, the various riots and social unrest is an opportunity to further swell the three types of military business.

This model applies not only to the regions 'Summit' - the highest density of troops - but also for regions where there are no armed resistance movement, such as Jakarta. Over two years ago, when other business sectors slumped, arms actually experiencing a boom business. We still remember, how before the Plenary Session of BANG-RI, late April 2001, several members of the House of Representatives comes with a gun. Even a legislator exhibit anti-bullet vest in a German television. The atmosphere of fear that print berkimpah sustenance for the two companies, PT Armindo Prima and PT Budimanmaju Megah, which legally obtained permission to import firearms from the U.S., Britain, Germany, even from Brazil. The two importers are considered legal after graduating Police selection, BAIS / BIA, and the National Police Headquarters (Infobank, June 2001: 88-89).

What aroused the fears of the people's representatives? Gus Dur's supporters mass factor from East Java, which has threatened to wage jihad to Senayan, when Gus Dur was deposed, was part cause panic. But let's see, how the escalation of mass mobilization to increase after the fall of Suharto, with the rise of political thugs organization with various flags, flags both nationalist and Islamic flags, including the formation of Jihad paramilitary troops with thousands of members "stormed" to the Moluccas, we can conclude how unequal ' New Order's disease "that among all the factions in our country's political elite.

But in addition, we also need to look at, frequent bombings against targets of political and economic, in this metropolitan city itself, which rarely revealed the actors, via the courts are open. On the contrary, many times the bombing incident in Jakarta has been associated with the act of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), or members of soldiers who had defected to the GAM. Rarely public reminded, that outside the state-owned enterprises, such as PT Dahana, there are two children's Integration Suharto, who has not been revoked license to sell explosives specially-made PT Dahana, PT Multi Nitroma Kimia and PT Tridaya Esta (Aditjondro 2002 : 18). Thus, these companies can be considered a part of the "gray businesses" military, because of our close relationship with the institutional military business.

ARMY GRAY BUSINESS IN WEST PAPUA

For the purposes of this paper, I am deliberately not going to discuss both the first and second legs, namely the institutional business and non-institutional business, which has been discussed in depth by other authors (see Iswandi 2000 and Indria Samego et al 1998). I will specialize in the "gray businesses" raging military in Papua. The most common gray business which has been running for three decades in this area is hunting the various species of rare animals, like birds of paradise and crocodiles, as well as wildlife abounds in some places, such as deer species Merauke.

Culturally, hunting birds of paradise and the deer have very different effects. Habits to capture him alive, or preserve birds of paradise, very hurt Papuans. Because for them,. 'Yellow bird' - the popular term for the bird so that for ordinary people - a symbol of a chief (Aditjondro 2000: 142, 208-9, 213-5).

Conversely, hunting deer in Merauke, supported by local people participate, both from the indigenous tribes Marind and Kanum, nor transmigrants from Java. Not just because deer Merauke is not a native species, but rather derived from the Timor deer (Cervus Timorienses) which was introduced by the Netherlands and has been adapted to the savanna environment Merauke, but because it adds to their animal protein supply as well, and have a broad consumer because both the population who are Christian or Muslim does not proscribe venison. Even a deer jerky industry has grown in transmigration areas in Merauke. That is why, many local people willing to do for the results with local police officials they rifle rent (Aditjondro 2000: 78-9, 220).

Just keep in mind that the formaldehyde used to preserve thousands of birds of paradise that has been flown out from the Land of Papua, has been purchased from people's tax money. Similarly, the bullet that had been wasted in hunting deer in the savanna Merauke. In other words, people who mengsubsidi broad is the hunting of animals by soldiers, police, and they kakitangan in Papua. Not to mention the jet fuel and gasoline for the Hercules military jeep, when several high-ranking special military flight from Biak to Merauke, complete with hunting weapons, using military jeep that was flown by Hercules.

One negative aspect is also of the depletion of natural resources involving an army unit in Papua, is the tendency of the unit from outside it to be a protector, as well as collusion, with forest loggers with their regional origin. That is what I observed in Arso area, Jayapura regency, in the 1980s, when an army unit from Hasanuddin Kodam time became patron to illegal logging by the immigrants from South Sulawesi. To the extent that less ajarnya the 'guard dog' illegal loggers, so they dare to hit the Head of Forestry Office of West Papua that time, who caught it illegal logging and rebuked them (Aditjondro 2000: 202).

But one new business that began running since the late 1990s, which have a social impact far more devastating negative terms of preservation of the Papuans themselves, is a collection of aloes wood (Gonystylus spp.), A type of wood below the level fragrance of sandalwood ( remember Malay proverb:'ve aloes, sandalwood too; already know, ask also?). And indeed, after the Timorese sandalwood tree is almost extinct, many overseas traders to switch to wood aloes, for incense materials, as well as souvenirs. Exports to Singapore, Korea, China, even to Saudi Arabia (Leith 2000: 317; Soerianegara & Lemmens 1994: 222).

Mobilization of the people to collect wood gaharu, have been carried out by the army practically throughout Papua. In the area of mining works contract of PT Freeport Indonesia, Inc.., Practical gaharu tree felling has stopped, because it was almost extinct. But in addition to ecological impacts, which still must be investigated, aloes wood clearing in West Papua were correlated with the spread of HIV / AIDS prevalence in Tanah Papua.

You see, to persuade the people of Papua to cut down their aloes wood, various co-sponsored army 'transmigration' of sex workers from Java to Papua. Furthermore, the gaharu traders heading inland timber Merauke, brings with sex workers from the town of Merauke. The sex workers were working with traders, seduce the chiefs for having sex with them, for a fee that aloes wood. Quality eaglewood paid, a measure of the length of sexual services that can be obtained from males that eaglewood depositor. One kg of high-quality aloe, for instance, type 'cat eyes', making men aloes depositor can have sex all night long with the sex workers, while for low quality, only matched by sex service for one to two hours.

Perhaps, Papuan men who received sexual services from the opposite sex who is lighter skinned, are satisfied with the sexual satisfaction obtained. And what was received, no nothing compared with the price of Rp 500,000 to Rp 5 million kilogram, which can be obtained fragrant timber merchants who export it to Singapore and other markets in the world.

Anyway, through barter eaglewood with sex, HIV / AIDS, which was first discovered in Merauke in 1981, due to sex between two men sex workers in four Thai fishermen, increasingly spread to all parts of Papua. Until the end of August 2001, carrying 702 cumulative cases of HIV and AIDS, in which 125 people of whom have died. From the number of people living with HIV / AIDS, about 340 people age 28 years and below. People with HIV / AIDS was almost found in all city districts and subdistricts in West Papua, has even spread in mountainous regions such as in Puncak Jaya, Paniai and Jayawijaya.

Create the troops who served in Papua, the transport cost products Melanesian fauna and flora are rare and expensive it does not matter, because who would dare to do raid against luggage troops who would return to its original unity outside of Papua? They are easy to use facilities Hercules TNI / AU, or Adri ships, to the smooth piracy natural resources in Papua it. So therefore, Papuan genocide go hand in hand with ekosida (ecocide) their homeland.

Talking about ekosida and other ecological decadence, like it or not we thought back on penandusan process underway in the downstream Ajkwa, because deposition of tailings (mining waste) that each day continues to settle there. Ironically, the ecological catastrophe that could also be a source of windfall for the troops who served there, especially the Special Forces unit. It is they who become the backing for contractors felling of dead trees along the stream S. Ajkwa it.

Ajkwa downstream watershed, especially in Kali Coffee, which is still a lot of fish, once again a source of sustenance for the soldiers and fishermen there. Special Forces Unit who served there, hold the fish catches of the fishermen. Instead, the fishermen can buy gasoline from 'stall petrol' which is managed by the Special Forces unit who served there. Indeed, local fishermen have the advantage of cheap gasoline. But on the other hand, soldiers who doubles as gasoline and fish traders, thereby closing the business opportunity for foundations Kamoro tribe, who was trained by the PT FII to take advantage of local economic pie, through the contribution of one percent of all profits that foreign airlines in Papua.

Finally, under the rubric "Business Grey" is, we should also highlight the cost of protection to be paid by enterprises in Papua to the army units and police on duty there. Of course, from all business entities, PT Freeport Indonesia was the one who should pay for protection of the largest, with the presence of military and police personnel between 1000 and 4000 people (Leith 2000: 330-1), although officially only one battalion of the third joint forces stationed in the area of their work contract, with the largest KOSTRAD placing personnel there.

The cost of protection, there is a routine and there is incidental, ie, when there are dignitaries of the state visit there. About two weeks ago, when Kostrad General Ryamizard Ryacudu visit there, the cost of securing the special guests who presented to the financial PT FII magnitude is said to reach USD 90 million. Meanwhile, when Taufik Kiemas, husband of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, who is also a member of parliament to visit there, in September last year, accompanied by 45 representatives of the people, government officials, and journalists, the cost of special security entourage 'great room' that is said to reach USD 500 million. It's known, such a large group should be split into several squads, which were flown around the area of contract work PT FII, even to the Merauke region, with the helicopters, which it cost per hour is very high.

According to official records, PT FII budgeted Australia's A $ 35 million a year to provide a vehicle for the armed forces that keep the contract area of their work, build their barracks, and help build a Naval Station near the port city Amamapare. But according to documents supporting the lawsuit Tom Beanal, Chairman LEMASA, when he sued PT FII, the company also budgeted cost for the construction of military bases, checkpoints following a house for those who served in the posts, the parade ground, munitions storage, space mess soldier, electricity and drinking water facilities, tennis courts and volleyball, and flag pole. Meanwhile, according to an American journalist, Julian Evans, PT FII also hire two people 'advisors' from the TNI (Leith 2000: 330). Ironically, despite being secured by so abundant, the units deployed in the region still works contract to maintain the many side business, start from the monopoly of the sex business in Timika, gold panning in Ajkwa children, held a black market, and every months blackmail villages when they receive donations PT FII than one percent of the company's profits (Leith 2000: 322).

To maintain a high protection costs, the impression of insecurity Papua must be maintained. In this case, shift initiative Papua's independence struggle from Kelly Kwalik which is the 'commander' local Tepenal the Papuan Presidium Council, it is detrimental to military parties. Because the shift in tactics of armed struggle, with occasionally kidnap foreigners who enter the forest, to the demonstrations and peace marches in the city, where no foreigners were killed, damage the image of 'the vulnerable' it. Not to mention, shift security duties of the parties to the police forces.

Like write Georg Elwert (1999: 45):

A particular cost-effective form of mobilising Troops is to create fear. Hence, propaganda acts as an Important instruments of production. From an economic perspective, this cans give a point-to-Otherwise What would be pointless violence. The fear of retaliation by the Victims leaves no option open but to join the army or support it for one's own protection. Fear of Revenge stabilises the system.

CONCLUSIONS AND ADVICE-SUGGESTIONS

If properly review above, that behind the murder of Theys Hiyo Eluay - or murder Clemens Arnold Ap, 16 years earlier (see Aditjondro 2000: 138-56) - is the effort to maintain, and if possible, expand, military business in Papua, the prevention of recurrence of this kind of political assassinations, require a more comprehensive settlement, and not only formal juridical.

First of all, the Indonesian people should refuse to continuously burdened with the costs of the militarization of underemployment, the military businesses who depend on public facilities as well as bullets and weapons, which was also purchased from public money.

Second, military dual function is still being used to justify military intervention of all the social turmoil in Indonesia - including those triggered and driven by the military itself - had to be removed completely, as police and civilian government officials provided with the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully, through ballot box and not the bullet box.

All forms of institutional business and non-institutional involving units and 'rogue' military and retired military and police, should be encouraged to compete normally in the market, without relying on a variety of conveniences, and are not able to compete, should be closed only.

The number of our military personnel, which can only be financed from the state budget a quarter of their spending, which encourages the proliferation of various military business, it's time to be rationalized on the basis of strict criteria of professionalism, in which only those who are capable and have high integrity is maintained, while others prepared to return to midst of society as ordinary citizens.

Special respond to the political assassination of Theys Hiyo Eluay, it is time the people of Papua have the opportunity to fight for their aspirations through peaceful means, not to increase casualties, while also showing on the international world, that Indonesia is a civilized nation, not a barbarous nations, who want to maintain colonial legacy of a region, without the consent of the people who live in the boundaries of colonial territory.

Newcastle, 20 March 2002.

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